The aim of this article is to determine the fair release prices for Bordeaux 2024, and to compare them with the prices actually charged during the en primeur campaign, which is now ending. The aim is twofold: to assess the consistency of châteaux' pricing strategies with the market, and to provide a decision-making tool for industry players.
En primeur has long represented a unique opportunity for wine-lovers: access to young wines, offered at prices systematically lower than those of vintages already available.
But at the turn of the millennium, châteaux began to realize that they were leaving too much of the profit to the buyers. The case of Château Haut-Brion, which was the first of the 1st growths to release its 2005, and which gave up millions of euros in profit by setting the price too low, left its mark. This feeling was only reinforced by the massive influx of speculators after the financial crisis. Why make great wines and build a reputation, if in the end a significant part of the fruit of this labor slips through the fingers of the estates?
The release of the great 2009 vintage in spring 2010 was a golden age for Bordeaux, with massive price rises. The frenzy died down in 2011. New markets, led by China, reduced their appetite for Bordeaux. Many speculators deserted the market. But châteaux only partially adapted their prices. The 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 vintages were offered at lower prices than their predecessors. But they were also inherently less good than 2009 and 2010.
The 2018-2020 trilogy briefly rekindled interest, further amplified by the pandemic. Yet the momentum never returned to the levels seen in the great vintages of 2005 and 2009. Prices remained too high to entice collectors or justify investment. Why buy a wine still aging in barrel when one can purchase a comparable vintage, ready to drink, at the same price?
The prices of the 2021, 2022 and 2023 vintages failed to revitalize demand. The 2021 vintage arguably stands out as one of the most striking examples of Bordeaux’s pricing misjudgment — a merely average year released at a price largely out of step with market reality. The outstanding 2022 vintage presented a chance to realign pricing, but it was released at excessively high levels. Some châteaux, eager to enhance their image, pursued overly ambitious pricing strategies. This reflects a misinterpretation of the economics of reputation and pricing: reputation isn't created by setting lofty prices, it is earned over time, gradually acknowledged by the market, with prices rising as a consequence. The 2023 vintage represented a last chance to reconnect Bordeaux with its markets. Inventories were full, and the vintage was excellent, but not outstanding. This gave it an interesting positioning, just behind 2022. With the right prices, it could have sold, without affecting (too much) the prices of recent great vintages. Of course, 2021 would have suffered, but in any case, a vintage sold at too high a price always suffers a price correction.
In reality, many Bordeaux 2023s were overpriced and have struggled to sell. Meanwhile, 2021s have continued to decline in value since bottling. The secondary market remains sluggish, with limited activity and a dearth of “deals” even among excellent vintages like 2018, 2019, and 2020. The average listed prices often fail to reflect actual transaction levels, which tend to be at least 10% lower. Buyers are adopting a wait-and-see attitude and will only step in if the pricing is genuinely compelling.
The approach used is based on a basic economic principle: the price of the latest vintage must be consistent with vintages already available on the market. Using data from 116 crus (vintages 2008-2023), we estimate the effects of reputation, quality and age. This enables us to calculate, for each wine, the equilibrium price that makes a buyer indifferent between a 2024 or an earlier vintage with comparable attributes (Masset et al., 2023). This exercise has already been carried out for vintages 2021, 2022 and 2023.
This logic of arbitrage has not been respected in recent years. For the 2024 vintage to find its market, release prices must be fully aligned with these market fundamentals. In fact, given the current weakness in demand, prices will likely need to be set slightly below the estimated fair value to generate interest.
Let's start by comparing the quality of 2024 with previous vintages. To this end, we rely on Wine Expert Ratings (WxR), developed by Wine Services. These ratings are derived by standardizing and aggregating the scores of a representative panel of experts, providing one of the most accurate and objective measures of wine quality available (Cardebat & Paroissien, 2015). Figure 1 plots the average WxR scores of the vintages 2008 to 2024. The 2024 vintage receives lower scores than the recent great vintages, but is comparable to 2014, 2017, and 2021, and clearly superior to 2013. In other words, it is likely not the weak vintage some had anticipated at harvest. It is a good vintage overall, marked by low alcohol levels and notable heterogeneity.
Figure 2 below shows the variations between this year's and last year's en primeur release prices for the same châteaux, with the release dates perhaps being part of a marketing strategy. First observation: prices have fallen sharply, by an average of 16%. Significant fluctuations can also be observed, with some wines remaining (more or less) stable, while others have lowered their prices by 30% to 40%. We can also see that there were significant drops already at the start of the en primeur campaign, but the biggest corrections relative to 2023 occurred at a time when the campaign was already well underway.
At first glance, the 2024 en primeur campaign resembles a clearance sale. But is that truly the case? Figure 3 compares the change in release prices between the 2023 and 2024 vintages with the deviation from the fair price estimated by the model. Wines in the upper quadrants were released at prices higher than those considered fair by the model; those in the lower quadrants were released below the model’s estimate. Two key insights emerge, shedding light on the strategies adopted by certain châteaux. First, a majority of wines were released at prices exceeding the fair value suggested by the model, sometimes by as much as 40% to 60%. Only about a quarter of the wines were priced in line with, or below, the model’s fair value estimate. Second, there is a clear correlation between the magnitude of price reductions from 2023 to 2024 and how close the release price is to the model’s prediction. In other words, the châteaux that made the largest price cuts are often those whose 2024 prices now align more closely with the model’s fair values.
The wines analyzed are listed in Exhibit 1 and classified into four categories: category A contains wines with a release price at least 5% lower than the fair price as estimated by the model; category B contains wines with a release price between -5% and +5% of the price estimated by the model; the last two categories contain wines with a release price 5% to 20% (C) or more (D) higher than the price estimated by the model.
Exhibit 1: Pricing by château
Category A: Wines with a release price at least 5% below the model's estimated price.
Angélus, Batailley, Carruades de Lafite, Cheval Blanc, Clos Fourtet, Durfort-Vivens, Haut-Brion, Kirwan, La Lagune, Lafite Rothschild, Le Petit Mouton de Mouton Rothschild, Les Carmes Haut-Brion, Mouton Rothschild, Pavie.
Category B: Release price between -5% and +5% of the model's estimated price.
Alter Ego de Palmer, Ausone, Beau-Séjour Bécot, Brane-Cantenac, Clerc Milon, Clinet, d'Armailhac, Echo de Lynch-Bages, Faugères, Figeac, Haut-Bages Libéral, La Chapelle de La Mission Haut-Brion, La Mondotte, Larcis Ducasse, Lascombes, Le Marquis de Calon Ségur, Le Petit Lion du Marquis de Las Cases, L'Evangile, Lynch-Moussas, Château Margaux, Pavie-Macquin, Pavillon Rouge du Margaux, Prieuré Lichine, Talbot.
Category C: Release price 5% to 20% higher than the model's estimated price.
Beychevelle, Blason d'Issan, Branaire-Ducru, Calon Ségur, Canon-La-Gaffelière, Cantemerle, Cantenac Brown, Chasse-Spleen, Clos du Marquis, Corbin, Cos d'Estournel, d'Issan, Domaine de Chevalier, Ducru Beaucaillou, Duhart-Milon, Fombrauge, Gazin, Giscours, Gloria, Grand-Puy Ducasse, Grand-Puy-Lacoste, Gruaud Larose, La Croix Ducru-Beaucaillou, La Dame de Montrose, La Fleur-Pétrus, La Tour Carnet, Lagrange, Langoa Barton, Laroque, Le Dragon de Quintus, Léoville Barton, Léoville Las Cases, Léoville Poyferré, Lilian-Ladouys, Lynch-Bages, Malescot Saint-Exupéry, Montrose, Pagodes de Cos, Phélan Ségur, Pichon Comtesse Réserve, Pichon Longueville Comtesse de Lalande, Potensac, Rauzan-Ségla, Saint-Pierre, Sociando-Mallet, Soutard, Trotanoy, Trotte Vieille, Valandraud, Vieux Château Certan.
Category D: Release price at least 20% higher than the model's estimated price.
Bélair-Monange, Canon, Carbonnieux, Beausejour (Duffau), Chauvin, Cos Labory, Dauzac, du Tertre, Haut-Bailly, Haut-Batailley, La Clotte, La Conseillante, La Mission Haut-Brion, Lafleur, Latour Martillac, Le Clarence de Haut-Brion, Malartic Lagravière, Ormes de Pez, Palmer, Pape Clément, Peby Faugères, Pichon Baron, Pontet-Canet, Quintus, Rouget, Smith Haut Lafitte, Troplong Mondot.
Most of the 1st growths are in category A. They reduced their prices to align with the secondary market. Categories A and B also include a number of châteaux that have, for several years now, consistently adopted pricing strategies in line with secondary market conditions. Examples include Brane-Cantenac, Clinet, Pavie Macquin and Talbot. Excluding premier crus classés, the most attractively priced wines relative to the model are Carmes Haut-Brion and La Lagune. Various reports suggest that Carmes Haut-Brion is one of the few wines to enjoy a certain degree of success this year.
Super seconds (i.e., wines that are at the top in terms of quality and reputation but not officially classified 1st growths) are in a complicated situation. Most of them fall into categories C and D. They are clearly trying to avoid diluting their brand by cutting prices too sharply. Some are also suffering the consequences of having set prices far too high for the 2022 vintage, and not reducing them sufficiently for 2023, leaving them with a correction that is difficult to make in a single campaign. Others, known for their historically reasonable pricing, may feel they didn’t overprice in the past and therefore see no reason to drop significantly. The issue is that the secondary market for these wines has become particularly unfavorable over the past two years. So, even if their previous en primeur prices were in line with the secondary market, a more significant price cut for 2024 would have been necessary to maintain that alignment.
Among the wines priced highest relative to the model, we find a mix of châteaux with more modest reputations and limited flexibility to adjust prices, estates that are (re)positioning themselves and seeking to support their brand image through elevated pricing, and wines with very limited production that are likely less sensitive to demand fluctuations. A good example is Lafleur: its release price remains virtually unchanged from 2023, yet it is still offered in limited quantities by several merchants.
Bordeaux and its en primeur wines no longer ignite the same passion. Among the various reasons behind this waning enthusiasm, one stands out in particular: pricing. Too often, release prices are disconnected from the realities of the secondary market. Nearly all recent vintages have been launched at inflated levels. Even 2019, once praised for its strong value proposition, now sees several wines trading at or even below their 2020 release prices.
For the 2024 vintage, châteaux were faced with three strategic options:
For consumers, the rule is straightforward: there is no rational (or even emotional) justification for purchasing an en primeur wine priced above its estimated fair value. The secondary market offers plenty of more compelling alternatives. Wines priced in line with model predictions aren’t necessarily bad buys, but they don’t warrant immediate action either. Conversely, wines offered below their estimated value may represent genuine opportunities. 2024 is a good vintage (we rarely see truly poor vintages anymore). The wine market, being highly cyclical and emotionally driven, is currently in a downturn. In this context, a wine that appears relatively underpriced is an opportunity well worth seizing.
A point not addressed in this article, but which further reinforces the prevailing uncertainty, is the geopolitical context. In particular, trade tensions and US tariffs are weighing on demand and calling for heightened vigilance.
It remains surprising that, years after Ashenfelter’s (2008) article, the wine market is still largely inefficient, with prices often misaligned with market fundamentals. Far from correcting itself, this inefficiency has worsened, to the point of threatening the sustainability of the Bordeaux system. This inertia weakens the entire value chain – producers, négociants, and consumers alike. While this article does not aim to analyze the root causes, a collective effort is urgently needed. A strategic wake-up call is now indispensable.